Abstract This paper comparatively reviews several commercially important fish stocks, their state and their management in various regions of the world including Japanese anchovy, Bay of Biscay anchovy, North Sea sandeel, North Sea herring, Icelandic cod, Barents Sea cod, South African cape hakes, sockeye salmon, chinook salmon, southern bluefin tuna, Pacific halibut, Greenland halibut and Patagonian toothfish. The reviewed fish stocks are systemized in three categories: (1) stock properties and status; (2) management structure and objectives; and (3) management advice. We gather evidence to outline qualities of management regimes that are recommended and highlight those that most often fail. Robust management, biological limits (reference points), implementation and consensus are critical points that separate successful and unsuccessful management regimes. We evaluate each fish stock's management performance relative to its management objectives and current conservation issues. Furthermore, we point out the importance of stakeholder involvement in fisheries management as well as the problems that international fisheries commissions face through examples from the case studies. Management successes tended to be single-nation and single-stock fisheries with capacity control and clear stakeholder involvement. Fisheries with fleet overcapacity, unclear objectives and illegal activity characterized the case studies with management problems.
Introduction
Fisheries management is a broad term that describes the process of administering control of fishing for exploited fish stocks. Fisheries management applies to numerous different fish species that live in various ecosystems and involve different political systems and user groups as well as local and cultural traditions.
In this way, one may view fisheries management as part of a larger fishery ''system''. Charles (2001) outlines the ''fishery system'' which is composed of the natural system (the exploited stocks and their ecosystem), the human system (economics, fishermen and culture) and the fishery management system (research, policy and planning). This is a simple organization of a complex field. Due to the diversity of fish stocks, management areas and industries, it is impossible to give management recommendations based on just an economic or biological consideration (Caddy and Seijo 2005; Degnbol et al. 2006) .
The logical starting point of fisheries management is the agreement and creation of objectives, either implicit or explicit. Multiple and conflicting objectives are often factors that interfere with fisheries management (Mardle et al. 2000) . Objective setting becomes a very complex field when situated amongst a multifaceted fishery system. For example, to achieve high fishing pressure on a stock, one must also accept increased risk of the stock collapsing. If one pursues to conserve the stock, one should realize the lowered fishing pressure associated with lowering biological risk. Figure 1 (Caddy and Mahon 1995) illustrates different trade-offs for various objectives for a multi-species reef fishery.
When evaluating fishery management, one should identify the multiple and conflicting objectives being addressed in the fishery. For example, are the managers striving for maximum employment, sustainable economic yield, hard-edged conservation, or something in between? One should evaluate the management from the starting point of its objectives in order to see if the management operates as the managers intended (Hilborn 2007) . As noted by Hersoug (1996) , political goals are inherently broad and fishery management objectives are usually fluid and constantly changing, depending on the strength of the actors or groups participating. Therefore, the objectives mark only the beginning; the importance of objectives is shown through the process of implementation.
For natural resource management to be effective, participation by those who are affected by the management is required (cited Baelde 2005) . Transparency and trust among the user groups can be an important factor to the success or failure of the management. The fisheries management system usually dictates how stakeholders can effect fisheries management and policy making. In a top-down authoritarian system, stakeholders can be shut out of the management process altogether, whereas in a simpler more democratic system, stakeholders have a more natural tendency to speak up and be heard regarding new regulations or management implications directed toward them. Caddy (1999) remarks that we are beginning to see research institutes using interdisciplinary teams, including stakeholders. He further notes that interdisciplinary work should begin with a discussion between specialists and end users on those elements essential to solve the management problems and the axioms and models underlying them.
In large management systems like those in the United States and the European Union, the system is made more manageable by downsizing it to the regional level. Regional fisheries management councils in the United States have been in place since 1976 and are a natural meeting place for stakeholders of resources within the region. Similarly, regional advisory councils (RACs) were products of the 2002 European Union Common Fisheries Policy reform and are the latest attempt in some areas of Europe to incorporate stakeholders and their collective views to fisheries management. The creation of the RACs is an acknowledgement that stakeholders can offer important insights towards fisheries management, especially through one coordinated regional voice.
Advances in stock assessment techniques and knowledge of stocks have led to a better scientific foundation for fisheries management and advice. However, recent history has shown the current tendency to fish down stocks, even to the point of commercial and biological collapse, neglecting to act Fig. 1 A schematic representation of fishing mortality rates corresponding to different societal objectives for marine resource use. The context here is of a multispecies surplus production model for reef fisheries (after Mahon 1992) . Source: Caddy and Mahon (1995) on scientific management advice. But there are also numerous examples of fish stock assessments, which in retrospect have proved to be erroneous and have contributed to management failure. Poor management may increase the stock assessment problems (e.g., unquantifiable effects of high, variable and unknown discarding rates and under-reporting of catches). Better use of available scientific knowledge of biological processes potentially useful in fish stock predictions (Ulltang 1996) may to some extent reduce stock assessment errors, and in an extensive review of available knowledge Köster et al. (2003) discuss a variety of biological processes of importance for the stock assessment problem.
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Methods for dealing with risk and uncertainties in fisheries science are important challenges in fisheries management (Peterman 2004) . Risk assessment in fisheries is defined by Peterman (2004) who points out the lack of standardized risk assessment procedure in fisheries management despite its development in the health sector. Charles (1998) addresses three forms of uncertainty; random fluctuations, uncertainty in parameter estimates and states of nature, and structural uncertainty. He argues that structural uncertainty is the most fundamental form of uncertainty ''reflecting basic ignorance about the nature of the fishery system, its components, its dynamics, and its inherent internal interactions''. Risk assessment would weigh probabilities of different uncertainties occurring in order to estimate their probability distribution and then choose the most appropriate management action (Peterman 2004) . To cope with these inherent uncertainties, management should be robust, adaptive and precautionary.
Other challenging factors are legal (Churchill 1998) and political (Hoel 1998) uncertainty in international fisheries management, political and social clashes for the resource, and illegal fishing activity.
There is a clear need for sustainable management of fisheries resources, but there is no need to start from scratch. The rationale of this paper is to review the management of a variety of stocks around the world by reflecting on current management shortcomings as well as advances. Some previous work in the area of reviewing fisheries management can be found in Sutinen (1999) who reviewed management measures, Bennett (2005) , OECD (2005) , briefly in ICES (2007a) and anecdotally in Hilborn et al. (2005) . The goal of this review was to obtain a broad biological and geographical range of stocks around the world. The fish stocks reviewed in this paper were selected by the aforementioned criteria and also according to available literature and available contacts. An information bias thus exists for the case studies. We first outline the objectives within each case study and the management methods used to realize the objectives along with possible problems encountered along the management path. Second, we identify success or failures within each case study in regards to their objectives. Finally, we summarize the qualities of management regimes that seem worthy of recommendation and highlight those that most often fail.
Web review of case studies
For the first part of this review paper we collected and examined material from published case studies, gray literature (government and committee reports, white papers and other unpublished works) and the World Wide Web. The stocks were chosen due to their commercial relevance and also data availability. The selected stocks were Japanese anchovy, Bay of Biscay anchovy, North Sea sandeel, North Sea herring, Icelandic cod, Barents Sea cod, South African cape hakes, sockeye salmon, chinook salmon, southern bluefin tuna, Pacific halibut, Greenland halibut and Patagonian toothfish. Navigation through governmental reports and internal institute studies was aided by a questionnaire that was completed by fisheries scientists with relevant knowledge of the review stocks and their management. We caution that fishing regulations and procedures do change without warning, which may cause error in our reporting and therefore welcome comments and corrections regarding Table 2 . The second part of information collecting for this review was based on phone, e-mail and face-to-face interviews of available fisheries scientists and managers. Through these interviews we obtained a closer look into the management process and to fact-check information from the gray literature.
We systematically organized our information for each managed fish stock into three categories: (1) stock properties and status (2) management structure and objectives and (3) management advice. Finally, in the analysis section, we review management performance and evaluation. Bennett (2005) reviews literature related to fisheries management and points to the problem of defining and measuring ''success'' in fisheries.
The highest score in management evaluationscoring scheme is ''success'' and refers to specific stock management that exhibits sustainable harvest with control measures applied to fishing mortality and fleet size. We evaluate a stock management entity by the term ''potential problems'' if it exhibits the foundations of responsible management (e.g., control measures over harvest or fleet size), but currently have challenges with one or more management issues (i.e., overcapacity). For the management entities labelled ''serious problems'', we mean that the management has one or more difficulties that are substantial and related to very low stock production or fleet overcapacity. And finally, the worst management evaluation score we define is by the term ''failure'', meaning management is ineffective and has resulted in stock collapse or fishing fleet overcapacity with no recovery plan in sight.
Stock overviews
Japanese anchovy (Engraulis japonicus) Yellow Sea and East China Sea; People's Republic of China
Stock properties and status
Japanese anchovy is a key species in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea ecosystem and consequently supports one of the world's largest fisheries.
1 (Iversen et al. 2005; FAO 2007) . As a short-lived, pelagic schooling species, the stock abundance is very sensitive to fluctuations in the recruitment. This is most likely the cause of its large population size variation, but overexploitation in recent years is believed to also be a major cause (Iversen et al. 2005; Nagasai and Chikuni 1989) .
Chen (1999) points out the increase of Chinese marine capture fisheries from 8 million tons to over 24 million tons in the period 1986-1995. The large increase in the number of powered vessels simultaneously with the decrease of non-powered vessels in the same time period reflects the fast development of Chinese fisheries. This increase in effort has led to decrease in catches and changes in catch composition; now mostly lower trophic species and smaller, immature juvenile fishes are caught in China's seas (Chen 1999) .
The stock reached a peak of over 4 million tons in 1993 after which the biomass slipped into a declining trend. In 1996, the actual catches start a trend of grossly exceeding the advised catch. Catches of Japanese anchovy subsequently reached a high of around 1.2 million tons in 1998 coinciding with the beginning of a collapse. As a result, in 2003 the fishery was at an historic low level of 110,000 tons (Fig. 2) . The FAO (2007) considers this stock ''fully exploited'' in the Northeast Pacific Ocean.
Management structure and objectives
Regulation of the anchovy fishery uses closed areas and closed periods (Chen 1999) . Otherwise, the fishery is quite open access. No quota regulation is issued because the data for the use of quotas do not exist (T. Thorvik pers. comm.).
Since 1993, the management objective for Yellow Sea anchovy was the potential sustainable yield of 500,000 tons. But from 1998, this level was reconsidered as the precautionary yield for the fishery (S. Iversen pers. comm.). High exploitation/employment seems to be the implicit management objective.
Management advice
In 1997, the advised precautionary catch was 500,000 tons while in reality one million tons was brought ashore by fishermen (Fig. 2) .
Beginning in 1998, the Yellow Sea Fisheries Research Institute (YSFRI) and the Institute of Marine Research in Norway (IMR) have held workshops in order to give management advice based on acoustic estimates and stock assessment (Hamre et al. 2004) . The actual catch, however, did not mirror the advice, which prompted scientists to recommend a fishing ban since 2002 to present-day. The ban may be lifted if the stock is observed to reach a level of 500,000 tons (the observed 2000-2001 abundance).
Anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus) of the Bay of Biscay; EU (France/Spain)
Stock properties and status
Also known as European anchovy, Bay of Biscay anchovy is a small (up to 15 cm), pelagic schooling fish found in the International Council of the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) sub-area VIII (Fig. 3) and comprised of mainly 0-2-year-old fish . Like other anchovies, recruitment can fluctuate wildly dependent on environmental conditions (Uriarte et al. 1996; Ibaibarriaga et al. 2005) .
French (pelagic trawl) and Spanish (purse seines) fleets both exploit Bay of Biscay anchovy and fishing occurs year round (STECF 2005; Ibaibarriaga et al. 2005) . The Spanish fleets fish the beginning of the year while the French fleets fish the latter part of the year. Anchovy presents challenges to fisheries scientists and managers since the stock occupies different areas at different ages. In addition, recruitment to the stock drives stock size, which must be considered during the fishing season for responsible management (ICES 2005c) .
Despite notorious fluctuations in the number of recruits, Bay of Biscay anchovy has been relatively robust throughout the 1990s with large year classes in 1992 (ICES 2005c 
Management structure and objectives
The management framework for Bay of Biscay anchovy is within the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) recently reformed in 2002 (OECD 2005) . There is no explicit management objective for Bay of Biscay anchovy (ICES 2005a , ICES 2006d 3), however managers aim to implicitly preserve the stock until a new strong year class recruits to the stock (ICES 2006d, volume 7).
Management advice
ICES gives scientific advice in the form of a total allowable catch (TAC) according to recent assessment. Managers of this EU fishery have set the actual TAC at 30,000 tons for many years. However, since the annual catches have fluctuated independently of that, the Bay of Biscay anchovy fishery is selfregulating in practice. ICES has proposed a two-step TAC for some years in which a preliminary TAC is proposed at the beginning of each year with its objective to keep the stock above B lim . In the middle of the year, catch data and spring survey estimates provide the background for a reassessed fixed TAC (Ibaibarriaga et al. 2005) . ICES is also in the process of developing a harvest control rule (HCR) for stock based on precautionary reference points.
The European Communities' Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) recommends use of a survey of year-class strength, conducted one year before juveniles recruit to the fishery, as an improvement over the current use of inseason surveys. STECF also agrees with the ICES notion of nursery closures to protect juvenile fish (STECF 2005) .
The recent commercial fishery failure in 2005 and subsequent closing prompted a special meeting of a the EU Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for (Iversen et al. 2005) Fisheries (STECF) subgroup to evaluate the fishery with the latest spring surveys. Among the many conclusions, the subgroup stated ''no alternative management measures short of closure should be considered at this time'' and agreed that the fishery should remain closed for at least one year pending results of a spring 2007 stock assessment (STECF 2006) . Furthermore, the subgroup affirmed that the Bay of Biscay anchovy is now totally dependent on future improved recruitment for any chance of recovery (STECF 2006) .
Lesser Sandeel (Ammodytes marinus) in the North Sea EU (Denmark)/Norway
Stock properties and status
The lesser sandeel is a small, shoaling fish that supports one of the largest fisheries in the North Sea, mostly found in ICES area IVb (Fig. 3) . Sandeel are very important to the food web of the ecosystem, mainly to piscivorous fish and seabirds (Pedersen et al. 1999; Lewis et al. 2001) , which may consume approximately 1.7 million tons of sandeel per year (STECF 2005) excluding seal and crustacean ingestion of sandeel. Lesser sandeel are stationary when mature and live buried in a sandy bottom (Pedersen et al. 1999 ), but swim up to the pelagic area to feed on plankton during the day. The larvae are pelagic in the spring, allowing some exchange between local subpopulations. Sandeel's preference for the patchy sand beds of the North Sea limits their distribution area, which can make them easy targets for experienced fishermen. Because of this, sandeel stocks in the North Sea should be considered as a ''complex of local populations'' (STECF 2005; ICES 2007b ). Natural mortality rates are high and are considered more detrimental to the population size than fishing mortality, while recruitment is more closely tied to environmental aspects than spawning stock biomass (ICES 2005a) .
Sandeels are a relatively short-lived species and thus stock size is strongly dependent on recruitment and fluctuations are seen in population numbers from year to year. The fishery has expanded greatly since the 1960s, but no clear trends in catches can be seen since the mid-1980s (FAO 1997 . Weak year-classes 
Management structure and objectives
The management framework for sandeel in EU waters is within the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) recently reformed in 2002 (OECD 2005) . The European Commission sets additional input/ effort control regulations in the form of kilowatt days (European Commission 2005) . There is no current adopted management plan for lesser sandeel (ICES 2005a) and no explicit management objectives exist (ICES 2006d, volume 6) . However, implicit management objectives include maximum sustainable yields consistent with the precautionary approach and prevention of local depletions where sandeel may aggregate (ICES 2007b) .
Management advice
ICES is the main management advisory organization for sandeel and gives advice for annual TACs for the fishery, based on an annual stock assessment for sandeel in the North Sea. Annual measurements are made, but predictions for TAC advice are of limited value since the incoming year class, which is poorly known at the time of the advice, dominates the stock. In-year monitoring using CPUE from the early phase of the fishery is being attempted at present (ICES 2007b) . In previous years the fishery has been largely self-regulating; the fleet stops fishing when the CPUE is too low to cover expenses (ICES 2007b) .
ICES stated that sandeel management in the North Sea should try to prevent local depletion of sandeel aggregations, particularly in areas where predators congregate (ICES 2005a) . Figure 4 illustrates the control rule for sandeel as set by the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) of the EU. The control measure here is effort in units of kilowatt-days. ICES advises the B lim reference point of 430,000 tons, whereas STECF admits a limited effort fishery (to monitor the stock) at 300,000 million individuals, approximately corresponding to the ICES B lim .
North Sea herring (Clupea harangus) EU/Norway

Stock properties and status
North Sea herring is a pelagic, schooling species that has been historically very valuable as an economic and nutritional resource for many European countries. North Sea herring is probably a mixture of several spawning components, but is assessed and managed as one stock in ICES area IV (Fig. 3) . The major stock components spawn in the autumn along the western coasts of the North Sea, and over-winters as larvae. Parts of the juveniles grow up in the Skagerrak, where they mix with Baltic spring spawning herring. Maturation takes place at age two to three years. Natural mortality is high on juveniles due to predation, but low (0.1) on adults (ICES 1992) .
The fishery can, in gross terms, be partitioned in a juvenile fishery with small meshed trawl for reduction purposes, and a fishery on adults for human consumption, with pelagic trawl and purse seine. Detailed catch data are available and most fleet segments are well sampled. Misreporting of catches by area, which implies misreporting by stock, is a considerable problem (i.e., catches are reported from Divisions VIa, IIa and Subarea VII, but are taken in the North Sea). Attempts are made to correct for this, but probably only a partial correction is achieved. In earlier years, juvenile herring has been misreported as sprat in some periods. Discarding and slipping takes place in some of the fisheries, and is in all probability underestimated.
The stock has been exploited for centuries and is still an important resource for the pelagic fleets in the North Sea. Typically, the spawning stock biomass (SSB) has fluctuated between 1 and 2 million tons. A limit biomass has been set at 800,000 tons, below which there are indications of impaired recruitment. After a period of heavy exploitation during an open access regime since the mid-1960s (Bjørndal and Lindroos 2004) , also corresponding to the development of modern purse seine technology, the stock collapsed in the mid-1970s with recruitment failure and a SSB in the order of 50,000 tons. The fishery was stopped in 1978, and the stock recovered rapidly, thanks to a series of strong year classes in the early Rev Fish Biol Fisheries (2008) 18:201-233 207 1980s (Bjørndal and Lindroos 2004) . Another nearcollapse was emerging in 1993-1996 when the SSB fell to 400,000-500,000 tons, again triggered by an intensive fishery. In May 2006, the North Sea herring received the Marine Stewardship Council's (MSC) certification for sustainable and well-managed fishery. However, after the fifth consecutive year of bad recruitment ICES now predicts the stock to continue to decline further, maybe due to increased natural mortality in the first winter (ICES 2007c) . The MSC audited their certification of the fishery, but concluded that the impaired recruitment was not due to any obvious fishing or other anthropogenic effects.
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Management structure and objectives
The EU and Norway manage the stock together. Management is largely by TACs set according to the HCR, explained in the next section. The TAC in the juvenile fishery is a by-catch limit in a fishery formally directed at sprat. The explicit management objective is to maintain the spawning stock biomass above 800,000 tons and otherwise harvest in accordance with the HCR (ICES 2006d, volume 6).
Management advice
The rising threat of stock collapse in the period of 1993-1996 led to the development of an HCR, which was agreed by EU and Norway in 1997 (Fig. 4) . The essence of that rule was a limitation of adult fishing mortality to 0.25 when the SSB is more than 1.3 million tons, and strong limitations on the fishery for juveniles. Fishing mortality at ages 0-1 was set at 0.12, but has in practice been well below. The agreement also included a fixed percentage share of the quota between EU and Norway, which stands at 71% and 29%, respectively (Bjørndal and Lindroos 2004; Christensen and Lassen 2004) . The HCR was designed to avoid the threshold biomass with a high probability, without causing more loss in long-term yield than necessary and was developed according to extensive medium-and longterm simulations. The management is complex because it also has to take into account fleets that fish for a mixture of North Sea autumn spawners and Baltic spring spawners in Division IIIa. As a recovery measure before the SSB had reached the level of 1.3 million tons, TACs were set according to an adult fishing mortality of 0.2. In practice, the adult fishing mortality was well above that level, partly because the stock was overestimated in the assessments, partly because of misreporting of catches. Nevertheless, the stock recovered gradually, and came into good shape. Recently, an additional constraint has been agreed on year-to-year variation in TACs, provided the stock is healthy, and a rule for reducing the target fishing mortality at SSB below 1.3 million tons has been added.
A recent complication in the North Sea herring management is a succession of five poor year classes, despite a SSB at a satisfactory level. The reasons for the poor year classes are not clear, but are probably linked to environmental changes (notably increased temperature and changes in the plankton communities, causing increased larval mortality) in the area. Zheng (1995) points out that herring is sensitive to the environment and that recruitment variation may be sensitive to species interactions. The validity of the current management plan may be questioned in light of the recent recruitment. There is no explicit way for managers to proceed forward in the current predicament of a healthy SSB producing four straight bad year classes and ICES regards the management plan and its ±15% limit on the TAC as not precautionary in this case (ICES 2006d, volume 6 ).
Icelandic cod (Gadus morhua) Iceland
Stock properties and status
The Icelandic cod stock is found in ICES area V (Fig. 2 ) surrounding the island of Iceland. Scientists recognize a southern and a northern population, the former being slightly larger. This cod stock is similar to most other cod stocks in its demersal behaviour. Atlantic cod represents 38% of all seafood export revenue in Iceland 3 and 40-50% of all merchandise exports (Baldursson et al. 1996) .
Since 1955 1959 , 1968 , 1973 , and 1983 /1984 (ICES 2005a .
Management structure and objectives
The management objective for Icelandic marine resources is sustainable utilization and employment. In 1990, The Fisheries Management Act was adopted in Iceland as a new cornerstone for Icelandic fisheries and firmly established the individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, which had been in earlier stages since 1984 (OECD 2005; G. Stefansson pers. comm.). ITQs are allocated to fishing vessels and are shares of the TAC for a harvestable stock. (Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries 1990).
The main management tool for Icelandic cod is TAC that is calculated using an HCR (Fig. 4) . ICES approved a formal HCR for Icelandic cod, implemented in 1995, as being in accordance with the precautionary approach ''provided implementation error is minimal'' (ICES 2005a). The HCR is constructed so that the TAC for each year is set as 25% of the biomass of cod aged 4 years and older. ICES notes that this corresponds to a fishing mortality rate of approximately 0.4 (ICES 2005a). There are no precautionary reference points for this stock (ICES 2005a) . In 2000, the government of Iceland amended the HCR by limiting year-to-year fluctuations in catches to 30,000 tons. (ICES 2005a (ICES , 2006d .
ICES advice for Icelandic cod in 2006 can be found in the Advisory Committee on fishery Management's (ACFM) report for 2005. In summary, ICES considers the state of the stock to be overexploited in regards to fishing mortality in relation to highest yield and the management plan. ICES also points to the current fishing mortality of 0.6, which is over the fishing mortality of 0.4 assumed in the HCR (ICES 2005a) .
Inspectors observe catch from cod fishermen and instigate a quick closure of the fishery for at least 2 weeks if observed catch includes more than 25% cod less than 55 cm. If several small areas are closed due to the quick closure system, this can lead to closure of a larger area and force fishermen to new fishing grounds. ICES, along with other scientists, regard small, quick closures as generally ineffective juvenile protection but note that larger and longer closures after several quick consecutive closures 
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Interannual variations of TAC not to exceed 15% of previous year's TAC Fig. 4 Schematic representations of harvest control rules cited in this review paper. F pa and B pa represent fishing mortality (harvest rate) and biomass, respectively, corresponding to the level specified in the subsequent precautionary approach. F lim, E lim and B lim represent fishing mortality limit, effort limit and biomass limit, respectively, which correspond to the level specified in the subsequent precautionary approach as a part of the management strategy. All numbers in tons refer to metric tons Other enforcement measures include closure of spawning areas during the winter spawning season for cod for 2-3 weeks to protect spawning fish since 1995. Minimum mesh sizes for the codend of a trawl net were set to 135 mm provided that a 'Polish cover' which covers the top of the trawl is not used.
Management advice
Stock assessment is carried out each year based on catch-at-age and age-structured survey indices from both fisheries dependent and independent sources (ICES 2005b) . Fisheries data include: catch (number, age and mean weight of landings), discards and misreporting, sampling intensity, and logbooks. Fisheries independent information includes the following data from surveys: abundance indices, mean weight at age and maturity at age (ICES 2005b) . All these data are used for stock assessment using different models, which produce different uncertainties and assumptions. Baldursson et al. (1996) highlight the large uncertainties that occur when using different models for stock-recruitment and conclude with the following statement: at low historical stock sizes, economic return on un-caught fish is larger than market rates of interest (Baldursson et al. 1996) . The ICES North Western Working Group reports that the current state of the stock is good (ICES 2005b) . No defined reference point exists for this stock (ICES 2006d, volume 2).
Barents Sea cod (Gadus morhua) Norway/Russia
Stock properties and status
Barents Sea cod is found in ICES northernmost areas, II and I (Fig. 2) . Also called Northeast Arctic cod, this stock is more pelagic than other cod stocks, and these cod migrate from their feeding area in the Barents Sea to the Lofoten area of northern Norway to spawn (Nakken 1994; Nakken et al. 1996) .
The stock productivity was very high after World War II when practically no fishing took place (Nakken 1994) . Beginning in the 1960s, high exploitation of the resource occurred and continued into the 1980s, resulting in very low spawning stock sizes. The stock probably also suffered from reduced recruitment during the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s further degrading the population. However, simulation studies showed that even with the observed recruitment, stock depletion could have been avoided by decreasing fishing mortality and/or increasing trawl mesh size to 150 mm (Ulltang 1987) . At the end of the 1980s, when it was evident that the stock was in very poor condition, catches and fishing mortalities were drastically reduced through regulations implemented by Norway and the USSR (Nakken 1994). Consequently, rapid rebuilding of the stock occurred in the beginning of the 1990s (Fig. 5) . However, during 1994-2000 fishing mortality increased again to former high levels leading to a strongly reduced SSB in 2000. Thereafter, some reduction in fishing mortality and increase in SSB have been observed (ICES 2006c). (Bogstad et al. 2005) .
Fishing quotas for Norway, Russia and third parties are set according to the HCR (Bogstad et al. 2005) . The total quota for Barents Sea cod for 2006 is 471,000 tons (ICES 2006c) .
The Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission regards catch stability and high long-term yield within the boundaries of the ICES precautionary approach as main objectives for the fishery (ICES 2006d, volume 3).
Management advice
The starting point of management for Barents Sea cod is an HCR that is constructed using the latest analytical stock assessment and agreed upon by The Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission. ACFM evaluates the proposed harvest rule through simulations and determines if the proposed harvest rule is in accordance with the precautionary approach (Bogstad et al. 2005) . Figure 4 shows the current agreed graphical representation of the harvest control rule. ACFM concluded in 2006 (ICES 2006d, volume 3) that the harvest rule is consistent with the precautionary approach when the SSB is above B lim and there is a low level of implementation error. Although the spawning stock biomass is above the precautionary limit, the current fishing mortality (0.74) is far above that the HCR recommends for long-term sustainable yield (ICES 2006d, volume 3). Nakken et al. (1996) estimated that maximum economic yield from the stock is attained at a fishing mortality around 0.24.
ICES estimated illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing at approximately 35% (166,000 tons) of the total reported landed catch in 2005, mostly due to trans-shipping in the Barents Sea (ICES 2006d, volume 3).
South African cape hakes (Merluccius paradoxus, M. capensis) South Africa
Stock properties and status
South African hakes are the most economic significant fisheries in South Africa (Geromont et al. 1999 ). There are two species of hake in South Africa: deepwater hake (Merluccius paradoxus) and shallowwater hake (Merluccius capensis). Demersal trawlers fish the former, and shallow-water hake is caught by demersal longlines and handlines (FAO 2005) . However, the species overlap in distribution at around 250-450 m depth. For many years these two species were not differentiated in catch statistics due to their similar appearance. Today the two species are considered two different stocks in the new management procedures after updated species research and may be distinguished by gear type. Females are larger than males that have a maximum length of 53 cm (Cohen et al. 1990 ). Scientists consider cape hakes as serial spawners that have no distinct spawning season (Powers et al. 2004) .
Before the advent of the long-line fishery, both of the cape hake species were lumped together in the global TAC. But since the long-line fishery is selective for M. capensis, each hake species will be considered separately in future management (FAO 2005) . The cape hake trawl (inshore and offshore) fishery started in the early 1900s and, like most commercial fisheries, increased substantially after World War II (Powers et al. 2004) . Fishing pressure continued to grow and reached a peak in 1972 when over 300,000 tons of hake were caught by a mostly foreign fishing fleet (FAO 1997; Powers et al. 2004 ). The stocks subsequently entered in a population decline which prompted larger mesh sizes (110 mm) in 1975. Then in 1977, the 200 nautical mile EEZ was declared, and foreign vessels were excluded from the fishery in 1983. These measures helped regain control of the fishery and aid the spawning stock biomass recovery of the cape hakes (Geromont et al. 1999 ) from under 30,000 tons in 1975 to approximately 50,000 tons in 2004 (Powers et al. 2004 ).
Management structure and objectives
South Africa transformed its fisheries management after its national independence in 1994 (van Sittert et al. 2006) . A new fisheries policy, the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA), was written in 1998 and in 2003, medium-term fishing rights were issued as a precursor to long-term issuance (FAO 2005) . Along with the current development of long-term fishing rights, South African fisheries management has developed other management tools such as marine protected areas.
The main objectives for the hake fishery are for stock recovery to be greater than the biomass corresponding to maximum sustainable yield and to implement long-term fishing rights to achieve longterm sustainability of the stock (Powers et al. 2004) . South Africa also makes use of traditional tools including annual TACs and a minimum mesh size of 110 mm (Powers et al. 2004 ). The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism delegates enforcement and administration of fishing regulations to the Marine and Coastal Management, (MCM; FAO 2005) . A Recent assessment in an audit conducted in conjunction with the Marine Stewardship Council's certification in 2004 reports good compliance enforcement in the hake trawl fishery and improvement the last two years by the MCM fishery monitoring ).
Management advice
South Africa uses the unique operational management procedure (OMP) as the scientific basis for setting the TAC. Reviews of the development of OMPs and practical OMP work are found in Cochrane et al. (1998) , Butterworth and Punt (1999) , Geromont et al. (1999) , Butterworth and Rademeyer (2005) and Kell et al. (2006) . The OMP is fundamentally analogous to HCRs found in the ICES and NAFO areas. Like HCRs, South African OMPs are pre-agreed formulas, which are simulation-tested and robust to uncertainty, in which the TAC is calculated. In contrast with HCRs, OMPs are not dependent on a single agreed annual stock assessment but instead use a population model adjusted to the year's available data (Geromont et al. 1999) . The OMP calculates the annual TAC using a population model with parameters based on commercial catch per unit effort (CPUE) and other current and historic stock-monitoring data (Rademeyer 2003) . The advantage of an OMP over an HCR is that there is pre-agreement on the assessment process itself. Thus, the OMP shows more stability in TAC levels (Rademeyer 2003).
Sockeye salmon (Oncorhynchus nerka) Bristol Bay, Alaska, USA
Stock properties and status
Sockeye salmon is one of the five species of anadromous Pacific salmon (Alaska Department of Fish and Game 1994) Geographically, sockeye salmon is found as far south as California and north to Siberia. Alaska and Japan have the two main centres of sockeye abundance.
Males can mature after one year in the ocean (called ''jacks''). Normal spawning age is around 4 years. Each year in the summer, sexually mature fish return thousands of miles from the pelagic sea to the freshwater rivers, from which they were hatched, to spawn.
There are many stocks of sockeye in Alaska located in five commercial regions. The Bristol Bay region has the largest sockeye runs in Alaska and includes five river systems districts for nine stocks. The fishing season runs from around June 10 to around the first week of August every year (P. Salomone, pers. comm.).
Salmon spawning stocks have generally increased since the 1970s (Hilborn 2006). One exception in Bristol Bay are the Kvichak jacks which had a stock abundance of approximately 20 million fish in the 1980s and has suffered a huge decline to current levels of 2-6 million fish. The Kvichak stock was elevated from a ''stock of yield concern'' to a ''stock of management concern'' defined by the stock having no production surplus for commercial fishing and also having production issues leading to steps to protect the stock from harvesting (Alaska Department of Fish & Game 2006, P. Salomone pers. comm.). The present concern level of The Kvichak stock is one step up from the ''stock of conservation concern'' in which no harvesting takes place at a conservation level. Scientists are still unsure exactly why the stock is struggling.
Management structure and objectives
Under the state constitution of Alaska, salmon resources are managed for sustained yield (Brady 2004) . The Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) manages the salmon under the state constitution conservation mandates with its Sustainable Salmon Fisheries Policy. The Alaskan State Legislature created the Alaskan Board of Fisheries (BOF), which develops fishery management plans and regulations as well as fishery policy and important allocation decisions. Consisting of seven members appointed by the governor of Alaska for threeyear terms, the BOF is hailed as being a direct link for stakeholders to the management process. Public comments and attendance to meetings are encouraged. Also, the BOF accepts written proposals for changes in fishing regulations thereby involving stakeholders indirectly in the regulation process (ADF&G 2005) .
In 1985, the United States and Canada signed the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act, which replaced the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission for trans-boundary populations. The treaty established an international salmon management regime between the U.S. and Canada. There is constant renegotiation, however, due to the controversy surrounding the treaty annexes; this is not such an issue in the Bristol Bay area due to its distance from Canada (P. Salomone pers. comm.).
The management objective for each river in the Bristol Bay area is: ''to achieve desired escapement goals for the major salmon species while harvesting all fish in excess of the escapement requirement through orderly fisheries '' (Westing et al. 2005) . Hilborn (2006) characterizes both the management structure and objectives for salmon in Bristol Bay as clear, which benefits from the direct line responsibility at the ADF&G.
Salmon in Alaska has a conservation based management program and is escapement based managed (Brady 2004; Hilborn 2006) . The ADF&G establishes salmon escapement goals based on inseason and post-season assessments. Managers conduct the in-season management by observing the salmon runs and calculating (through methods including observation towers, weirs, sonar, aerial surveys, test fisheries and fishermen input) salmon abundance. The appropriate management decisions are then based on this calculated abundance. The ADF&G has the authority to close a fishery in-season or to increase the total harvest based on in-season abundance. Salmon fisheries in Washington, Oregon, and Canada are adopting this real-time assessment. Post-season assessment also occurs, usually by aerial counts on spawning areas to provide numbers for spawning indices (P. Salomone pers. comm.). The Alaskan Department of Public Safety intensely polices the enforcement of permit regulations on gear type (drift or set nets) as well as the set fishing boundaries with a force of 10-12 police officers that monitor the fishery by air and on the water using helicopters and enforcement vessels (P. Salomone pers. comm.).
Management advice
Management advice is given for biological objectives of escapement by stock size estimations (Hilborn 2006) . Stock estimations are considered accurate due to clear waters for tower-counting techniques (Hilborn 2006) . Paul Salomone, area management biologist for the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, describes the available data for in-season assessments and post-season information on sockeye as reasonably accurate but subject to environmental issues like water level. He adds that some more work could be done to improve forecasting, but the science overall is satisfactory (P. Salomone pers. comm.).
Chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) Puget Sound, Washington, USA
Stock properties and status
Chinook salmon is the largest species of anadromous Pacific salmon and is also known as king, spring or tyee salmon. Puget Sound chinook is an evolutionary distinct unit and includes many different populations. These populations are then classified according to their migration seasons (spring, summer or fall) but other discrepancies exist between the populations, such as time of freshwater entry, spawning period and specific natal stream return timing. Hatchery programs are in effect in efforts to restore some chinook populations and today make up a large part of spawning chinook.
In the evolutionary significant unit (ESU) of chinook in Puget Sound, there are 31 ''historically quasi-independent'' populations (Good et al. 2005) . In general, wild populations of chinook have fallen in numbers in recent years. Current stock productivity is at best stable, but mostly declining (W. Beattie pers. comm.). The history of stock status is very dependent upon each river system. For example, the Skagit River system is very large and is considered fairly healthy (W. Beattie pers. comm.). Other smaller systems, like the White River system, have very low population abundances (Fig. 6) .
Management structure and objectives
In 1974 In 1999 and 2000 the management of chinook was led away from the traditional escapement goals to exploitation management with harvest rate ceilings. Indian tribes are allocated 50% of the surplus in each river, which are allocated then to commercial, and subsidence fisheries. The State's 50% of the population surplus mostly is allocated to sport fishermen and little to commercial fisheries.
Stock status is assessed according to age-specific forecasts, back-constructed cohort size and agecomposition of past years' abundance. However, data quality varies immensely. The Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) and the Northwest Washington Indian Tribes are responsible for stock assessment for the chinook salmon in the Puget Sound.
Chinook, like other anadromous salmon species, is very vulnerable to freshwater river habitat destruction. In 1999, the Puget Sound chinook stock was placed on the Endangered Species Act's list of ''threatened'' species by the NMFS. Due to this recognition, management objectives have a highly conservative backbone and rebuilding of the Puget Sound ESU is explicit. The admittance is even made to forgo harvesting of chinook in the more stable systems in order to provide adequate conservation of 
Stock properties and status
Reproductive studies of the highly migratory southern bluefin tuna are lacking, but most scientists believe that reproductive maturity occurs around an age of 8-12 years and about 1.5 m in length and 90 kilograms in weight (Canton and McLoughlin 2005) .
The southern bluefin tuna is a very important fish commercially and is exploited mostly by members of the CCSBT: Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, and Taiwan (officially referred to as the ''Fishing Entity of Taiwan'' by CCSBT). The Philippines and Indonesia are currently cooperating non-members. Australian and Japanese fishermen have exploited southern bluefin tuna since the 1950s. In 1961, the fishery hit a peak yield of 81,605 tons and heavy fishing levels, mostly due to its large demand on the sashimi market in Japan, continued into the 1980s. Currently, the Commission agrees that the stock biomass is well below the 1980 level.
Management structure and objectives
In the 1980s it became clear that management restrictions were necessary in the form of strict quotas to control the fishery and able the population, considered to be a single stock, to rebuild. Increased concern for the Southern bluefin tuna stocks led Australia, Japan and New Zealand to agree to a voluntary management system, which became the CCSBT in 1994. Conservation, management and optimal utilization are three objectives the Commission mentions in their Convention. (CCSBT 1994) The primary objective for the CCSBT is to have a spawning stock biomass at the level observed in 1980 by the year 2020 (Polacheck et al. 1999; Polacheck 2002 ).
The CCSBT is responsible for setting annual TACs and allocates quotas to each member country and cooperating non-members and conducts and coordinates the Scientific Committee's research and scientific recommendations to support management objectives (CCSBT 2005a) . Stock assessment of Southern bluefin tuna is an international and involved process. The analytical stock assessment procedure uses adaptive virtual population analysis (Polacheck 2002) and catch-at-age and length models (A. Bodsworth pers. comm.) to estimate historical stock levels. The estimates are considered highly uncertain (Polacheck 2002).
Management advice
In October 2005, a fishery management procedure (MP) was agreed upon after 3 years of development within the CCSBT. The MP consists of ''fitting a discrete age-aggregated Fox dynamic production model'' to historic catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) and catch data from a section of the long line fishery (CCSBT 2005b) . However, the MP is not currently able to proceed and is scheduled for review after the Commission acknowledged ''substantially under-reported'' farming and market data the last 10-20 years 4 , implying IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing and enforcement problems common for high market value fish. Enforcement of CCSBT agreed measures is carried by domestic legislation for all contracting parties (E. Ho-Shon pers. comm.).
Pacific halibut in British Columbia (Hippoglossus stenolepis) International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC), Area 2B
Stock properties and status
Pacific halibut is a large groundfish found in the Pacific Ocean from California to Alaska. Females spawn at around 12 years and males 8 years.
The history of the Pacific halibut fishery dates back to 1888 (Trumble 1997) and is one of the oldest fisheries on the west coast of North America. Concern of the evident overfishing of the resource was the inspiration of the convention between Canada and the United States that established the International Pacific Halibut Commission in 1923 (Trumble 1997) .
Recently catch numbers have been quite stable, although no increases in catch have been seen since the start of the individual vessel quota system Canada adopted in 1991 (Gates 2005) .
Management structure and objectives
The International Pacific Halibut Commission was established in 1923 by a convention between Canada and the United States (King and IPHC 2005) . The IPHC's mandate is to research the biology of the Pacific halibut and to manage the stocks and conduct stock assessment within the Convention waters of the United States and Canada. Since then, both countries have cooperated within the commission with data gathering and stock assessment in order to set annual quotas. Fisheries data and independent scientific data are both used in exploitable stock assessment and the IPHC stands out among international commissions in fisheries due to their vast quantity of long and good time series of data available (Wilen and Homans 1998) . The Marine Stewardship council certified the United States North Pacific halibut fishery, under IPHC management jurisdiction, as a responsibly managed fishery in April 2006. 5 Currently Canada uses an individual vessel quota (IVQ) system, established in 1991, to divide the annual TAC. The United States followed suite in 1995 with individual fishing quotas (IFQs). The types of output control have proven to be a successful solution for the previous free-for-all overcapitalization fishing practices of the fleet in which dangerous practices occurred when the cost of not fishing was so high that fishing vessels would fish in hazardous weather conditions 24 hours a day (OECD 1993). The Commission's overall objective for the halibut fishery is to ''maintain a level of spawning biomass'' above a ''historical minimum that last occurred in the mid-1970s''. 6 
Management advice
The IPHC targets a 22.5% fixed harvest rate for areas 2A-3A (Fig. 7) . 7 In 2006, a single coastwide assessment replaced the single area assessments conducted earlier years to estimate total abundance. Then the estimated abundance in each area from survey CPUE and bottom area are used to find the exploitable biomass and catch limits (International Pacific Halibut Commission 2006).
Greenland halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides) Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) in Division 3LMNO
Stock properties and status
Greenland halibut is a deep-water flatfish and is found off both the east and west coasts of Greenland, along the continental shelf and in eastern Newfoundland (Vis et al. 1997) . Males recruit to the spawning stock biomass at about 4-5 years of age; females quite later at 9-10 years.
In 1990, the fishery development of Greenland halibut began in NAFO Division 3LMNO (Fig. 8) . After the direct fishery moratoriums for both Southern and Northern Grand Banks cod in 1994, Greenland halibut's fishery status changed from an underutilized stock to one of high importance (Vis et al. 1997) NAFO manages halibut in Division 3LMNO (see Fig. 8 ), which is considered part of a biological stock complex including halibut in Subareas 0 and 1. This mostly trawl fishery consists of an international fleet to which parts of the TAC are allocated each year. For 2007, the EU (Spain/Portugal) received 59% of the total TAC of 11,856 metric tons followed by Canada (15%), Russia (13%), Japan (10%), Denmark and France (approximately 1.6% each). 8 The total TAC for 2007 is 1,853 tons lower than that of 2006.
Management structure and objectives
The structure of NAFO is comprised of the General Council, the Scientific Council and the Fisheries Commission, each with their respective standing committees. The Fisheries Commission is in charge of conservation and management of the NAFO's Regulatory Area, defined as the high seas of the Convention Area (outside the U.S. and Canadian EEZs). The delegations of NAFO Contracting Parties include stakeholders from fishing associations and industry workers. Membership in the Fisheries Commission includes each Contracting Party that currently fish or expects to fish in the Regulatory Area. The current management objective for the stock of Greenland halibut in Subarea 2 and Divisions 3KLMNO is to allow a stable yield over the longterm by attaining a stable exploitable biomass of halibut aged 5+ years of 140,000 tons on average (NAFO 2005c 
Stock properties and status
Patagonian toothfish is a large, demersal fish found in the southern hemisphere including the Antarctic. Juveniles may be semi-pelagic, but become demersal at 12-15 cm and after maturing (at approximately 70-90 cm, 6-9 years of age) migrate to deeper sea habitats along the Kerguelen shelf of over 2,000 m depth. Slow growth and low resilience characterizes the fish's relatively moderate fecundity of 48,000-500,000 eggs per female per spawning season (Diaz et al. 2004 ). Patagonian toothfish, also known as Chilean seabass, is found in the EEZ of the following countries: Chile, Argentina, Australia (sub-Antarctic islands), New Zealand, France, United Kingdom and South Africa (Diaz et al. 2004) . Fishing activity in the sub-Antarctic started in the early 1970s and at this time toothfish was only caught as by-catch (Lord et al. 2006) .
Commercial fishing for Patagonian toothfish in the French EEZ of the Kerguelen Islands (Indian Ocean sector of the Southern Ocean, see CCAMLR Convention Area map in Fig. 9 ) started in 1985 when commercial quantities were found (Australian Antarctic Division 2006; Lord et al. 2006) . In 2001, longlines replaced trawls as the primary fishing gear in the Indian Ocean sector of CCAMLR and have shown a downward trend in CPUE since the start of the fishery (Lord et al. 2006 ). An even more dramatic downward CPUE trend is seen in the neighbouring South African EEZ of the Prince Edward Islands' toothfish fishery that opened in 1996, due in part to the large illegal fishery for which the area is now known (Brandão and Butterworth 2002) .
Management structure and objectives
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) started in 1982 as a response to krill overfishing and its potential to disturb other marine life in Antarctic waters.
11 Since then, the CCAMLR has developed a Scientific Committee with two working groups: Working Group on Ecosystem Monitoring and Management and the Working Group on Fish Stock Assessment. The Scientific Committee gives scientific advice to the Commission for TAC settings. Interestingly, CCAMLR has an ''Olympic'' strategy for agreeing on quota levels, that is to say that they are agreed upon consensus. This idealistic way of fisheries management reflects the view of CCAMLR that no one owns the marine resources of the vast Antarctic high seas (S. Iversen pers. comm.).
The objective for CCAMLR is to conserve the marine life of the Southern Ocean while allowing rational harvesting.
12 Annual quotas are set by CCAMLR based on the reports of the Science Committee at meeting held at their headquarters in Hobart, Australia (Tasmania). Quotas set for Patagonian toothfish must be held in the realms of the precautionary approach and CCAMLR's ecosystembased management (S. Iversen pers. comm.).
Enforcement of the TACs in CCAMLR areas is totally up to the fishing vessel's country. All fishing vessels are required to report their catches regularly (approximately daily or once every three days) to CCAMLR. Total catches then are calculated and updated by CCAMLR until the total TAC for the area is met after which the area is closed for fishing. Fishing regulations, called ''Conservation Measures'' by CCAMLR, vary considerably from area to area (CCAMLR 2006, N. Smith pers. comm.) .
Mostly due to its high market value and geographical isolation in the Southern Ocean, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is the biggest threat facing Patagonian toothfish, or ''white gold'', today. During the fishing season in 1996-1997, the number of IUU catches exceeded those of the regulated fishery by at least a factor of five. (Kock 2000) Fishing illegally for toothfish is a calculated low-risk business for many pirate fishermen. The network of pirate fishermen, boat owners and processors is so vast that the World Wildlife Fund estimates that 50% of all marketed toothfish is caught illegally. Obvious consequences for IUU activity include reductions in fish numbers down to below precautionary levels leading to a collapse of the legitimate fishery regulated by CCAMLR. However, the Scientific Committee of CCAMLR reports that zero IUU catches occur inside the French EEZ (Division 58.5.1) (CCAMLR 2005) .
Management advice
The upshot of management advice in 2005 for CCAMLR Division 58.5.1 was that the area needed more studies in order to assess the stock (CCAMLR 2005) . No stock assessment is available for Division 58.5.1 and size-at-maturity is the only biological parameter available for the fishery (CCAMLR 2005) . However stock assessment techniques, such as tagging experiments, are currently being developed by CCAMLR working groups. Stock assessments are carried out using production and recruitment models in a rather rough way since much data lacks for Patagonian toothfish (S. Iversen pers. comm.) and biomass surveys are encouraged to be carried out to understand observed stock trends (Lord et al. 2006) . A research cruise to assess fish stock biomass in the Kerguelen Islands is scheduled by France for 2006 (CCAMLR 2005 .
Analysis of management performance
This literature review scratches the surface of fisheries management from different corners of the world. It was our intent to highlight and critique some important fish stocks without going into a deep analytical analysis of fisheries management. A quick glance at the overview of management in Table 1 shows no clear pattern of the management components of a ''successful'' management regime or a ''failed'' one. Garcia and Grainger (2005) echo this observation: ''Well managed and devastated fisheries coexist sometimes in the same region or country''. We do note, however, that the management successes included in this paper tend to be single-nation (with Fig. 9 Map of the CCAMLR convention area. Source: http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/conv/map.htm and fleet size, potential problems: exhibits foundations of responsible management, but currently has problems with one or more management issues, serious problems: substantial problems related to very low stock production, low recruitment and/or fleet overcapacity, failure: management has failed to have control which has resulted in stock collapse with no recovery plan in sight the exception of North Sea herring and the IPHC which includes Canada and the United States) and single-stock (not mixed) fisheries. Table 2 illustrates the interesting point that fishing regulations (tools created with the explicit intention to control fishing) themselves do not give any basis for predicting success or failure in management. In a summary of fisheries management measures of countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Sutinen (1999) found very limited evidence to the performance of measures including size selectivity, closures, effort quotas and gear restrictions, suggesting these measures are conducted ''more on faith than on a sound factual basis''. On the other hand, much information exists for TAC, limited licences and individual quota management measures (Sutinen 1999) .
The following section takes a closer look at each of the reviewed fish stocks and their management performance and evaluation.
Japanese anchovy
The management of Japanese anchovy in China may be described as a failure. The Yellow Sea anchovy fishery is a recent example of the crash of a productive fishery; one of the world's largest fisheries exploiting a stock of 4 million tons to stock collapse of 250,000 tons over a 10-year period. High levels of fishing effort and overcapacity of the fishing fleet were the likely driving forces (S. Iversen and T. Thorvik, pers. comm.) .
Despite the collaboration of top Norwegian fisheries scientists with their Chinese counterparts since 1984 and the Norwegian gift of the ''Bei Dou'' research vessel to the People's Republic of China for acoustic and assessment activities, the stock has gone from boom to bust. This is an illustration that fisheries management is a system and not entirely based on research capability (Caddy and Seijo 2005) . For example, the ''Bei Dou'' project was able to estimate a stock-recruitment relationship for anchovy and thus give management advice. This advice, however, was not implemented, which caused the stock to collapse and scientists to recommend a complete ban on direct anchovy fishing (Institute of Marine Research 2004).
Viewed from a socio-economical standpoint, many Chinese fishermen are very poor with little to no alternative work. They must continue fishing, even at low stock levels, to be able to survive. However, this ultimately results in economic ruin for many stakeholders in the fishery, let alone ripple effects for the rest of the Yellow Sea ecosystem upon depleting a key species.
Currently, there is no plan of action for rebuilding the anchovy stock. The Chinese authorities seem to believe in the closed areas and periods for anchovy management (T. Thorvik pers. comm.). However, it is clear that decommissioning the current overcapacity of the fleet is needed before a rebuilding process can take place. Secondary to decommissioning, a foundation of fisheries statistics is needed for future quota regulations. We conclude management a ''failure'', which has led the stock to desperate shape.
Bay of Biscay anchovy
Bay of Biscay anchovy is almost a self-regulating stock: the fixed TAC is sometimes not taken and sometimes overshot. Due to the complexities of recruitment variation in this short-lived species, managers are having a difficult time distinguishing recruitment overfishing (Cushing 1972) from recruitment failure due to unfavorable environmental conditions. Managers and scientists admit that fixed TAC regimes and the use of reference points are not ideal strategies for short-lived stocks (STECF 2005; Ibaibarriaga et al. 2005) .
Currently, the ICES working group that covers Bay of Biscay anchovy (Working Group on the Assessment of Mackerel, Horse Mackerel, Sardine and Anchovy, WGMHSA) recommends a workshop and further discussion between managers, stakeholders and scientists in order to develop alternative management strategies to the annual fixed TAC (ICES 2006a) . For a stock with such variable recruitment, annual fixed TACs are not recommendable.
If scientists were able to give quantitative management advice to managers, Uriarte et al. (1996) note that a recruitment forecast combined with a type of direct assessment, such as acoustic or egg surveys is necessary for this type of advice. But the lack of a recruitment index for Bay of Biscay anchovy prevents scientists from predicting recruitment simultaneously with the scientific advice. This is seen to be a major weakness for management of this stock (ICES 2006b) .
Due to the current recruitment collapse, lack of a long-term management plan and vision for anchovy in the Bay of Biscay, we label this management with ''serious problems''. We agree with the ICES comment in its 2005 WGMHSA report (ICES 2005a ) that stakeholder involvement is necessary when creating a management strategy. It is very clear that the EU should follow up on its own committee's advice of development for a long-term management plan, in collaboration with stakeholders, as soon as possible (STECF 2006) . We note that stakeholder involvement is especially needed here due to the complications of managing a highly fluctuating, shared resource between neighboring countries fishing with different gears at different times.
Lesser sandeel
The importance of sandeel for a healthy and diverse North Sea ecosystem is motivation for a well-managed fishery. There are several reasons why management of sandeel is important: the species is key in the North Sea ecosystem, and the fish are quite easily located and targeted by fishermen since they prefer sandy patches and tend to cluster, thereby leading to very high catchability, and the fishery is industrial and favors long-term sustainability of the stock.
The July 2005 closure of the sandeel fishery came after new real-time management and the state of the stock ''having reduced reproductive capacity'' according to ICES (STECF 2005) . Although there is an HCR in place for North Sea sandeel, there is concern that it might not be restrictive enough when the stock is low (H. Jensen pers. comm.). More insight into recent management activity for sandeel is found in ICES (2007a, b) .
Previous self-regulation and recent attempts of inyear monitoring have not been able to adapt to a sequence of poor recruitment. The stock is not in good shape and several fishing grounds are depleted (ICES 2006d, volume 6) . Effort must be carefully observed as advances in technology increase effectivity of effort, thus undermining the concept of effort control (Branch and Clark 2006) . Greenstreet et al. (2006) reviewed the area-closure of the sandeel fishery off Scotland and found that the closure was effective in reducing the effort, but not necessarily helped reduce catches. Also management must reconcile lack of fishery-dependent data in the closure area with scientific cruises if the moratorium is expected to be assessed (Greenstreet et al. 2006) . Current management of lesser sandeel includes the precautionary approach, but there are still strong concerns for the state of the stock (ICES 2007b). Thus we give the management for sandeel the label of ''potential problems''.
North Sea herring
The present management for North Sea herring was one of the first examples of long-term strategic thinking in the ICES area. There is broad consensus that the management of the North Sea herring has been a success, leading to a rebuilt stock. The success has been possible even though the fishing mortality generally has been well above what was intended. This is probably because the fishing mortality in the HCR was set at the left part of the yield-recruit relation, well below the point where the risk to the limit point starts to increase.
Overfishing, concealed as misreporting by area, has been a constant problem for management (ICES 2007c) . Satellite monitoring has been helpful to reduce the problem, but has not so far prevented it fully. The management measures have gradually become relatively well accepted by fishermen and the industry. One reason for this agreement may be that they were introduced at a time where other herring stocks were in a good state. Another reason may be that reductions in TACs have led to increase in the market prices.
Stakeholders in the North Sea herring fishery meet formally in the Pelagic Regional Advisory Council as a result of the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy in 2002 and are allowed to submit recommendations or comments to the European Commission or Member States regarding management of North Sea fish stocks.
13 However, the members of the European RACs have been disappointed in their lack of pull in the heavily top-down, centralized management approach of the European Union. Gray and Hatchard (2003) argue that the 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy has mostly been rhetorical and can only become effective if the Commission hands over regional management powers to the Regional Advisory Councils.
The recruitment has been exceptionally poor the last five years (ICES 2007c ) and this presents a major roadblock for management success. Following the HCR strictly may provide an adequate response even to this situation, but this remains to be seen. We give the ''potential problems'' label to this stock's management based on the current depressed state of the stock, but also recognize the positive effects of lowered fishing mortality and the resulting increase in spawning stock biomass since the HCR's implementation in 1996.
Icelandic cod
We label this management with ''potential problems''. Current fishing mortality levels are above those that give larger long-term yield (ICES 2005a) . The future stability of Icelandic cod does not look bright when one takes into account low capelin abundance and trends in environmental change that may have a future negative impact on the fishery. The ICES North Western Working Group reports that three of the four most recently assessed year classes are estimated as poor. This raises uncertainty of the size of the spawning stock in 2009 /2010 (ICES 2005b .
Some problems with enforcement stem from the smaller artesian and owner-operated fishing fleets, which have no entry limitation (G. Stefansson pers. comm.). Despite the scientific resources, good knowledge of population dynamics and experience in ITQs, Icelandic cod is still overfished. The main issue is to lower fishing morality rates which may be done in two ways: lowering the fished proportion in the HCR to 22% and issuing larger, longer closures. Baldursson et al. (1996) conclude that from an optimal economic and biological standpoint, the spawning stock should increase at least three-to four-fold and that catches be lowered to below 175,000 tons.
We view the Icelandic cod fishery as a collapse waiting to happen if current trends in spawning stock biomass size, low recruitment and high fishing mortality continue. Medium-term evaluation of the 22% HCR shows strong potential for steady growth of the spawning stock biomass (ICES 2005a) . Reducing the fishing morality in the HCR from 25% to 22% would mean large losses of catch (10 billion Icelandic crowns) the first year. However, losses would theoretically be replenished in years to come as higher biomass and catches.
Scientific simulations of the effectiveness of fishery closures show that only very large closures protecting one half of the entire cod biomass are enough to be effective (G. Stefansson pers. comm.). The power to enhance cod stocks and future profits in Iceland really lies with the political powers. An Icelandic Fisheries Minister committed to reducing fishing mortality would need strong government support for the recommended changes.
Barents Sea cod
We acknowledge the foundations of sustainable management in accordance to the precautionary approach for Barents Sea cod. Also in line with good management, stakeholder participation by the Norwegian National Regulation Board has been in place since the current regime's start in the mid-1970s (A. Hoel and K. Nedreaas pers. comm.) . However, we do not consider management as a success and give the management the ''potential problems'' label for the following reasons. The main weakness is the inability to control fishing mortality to the agreed level prescribed by the HCR. Substantial illegal fishing and catch misreporting hamper the management effort. Assessment and survey resources are impressive, but ACFM (ICES 2006d, volume 3) notes that unreported landings will reduce the effect of management measures and will undermine the intended objectives of the harvest control rule. It further notes that in a longer perspective it is unlikely that the HCR itself under such conditions can protect the stock and future fisheries. Actions are needed to stop the unreported fishing. The Norwegian Fisheries Directorate enforces the TACs in the Norwegian EEZ by inspection at sea and the requirement of tickets issued upon landing the catch. The Russian fleet is not subject to written reports of landings, as their Norwegian counterparts, but to less reliable verbal reporting of catches. We suggest better cooperation with the industry, especially with the Russian industry, for reporting landings as a measure to discourage illegal fishing.
South African cape hake
The process of rebuilding the cape hake stocks from the overexploitation of the 1960s and 1970s has brought recognition to the South Africa hake fishery as one of the best-managed fisheries in the world (Economic and Sectoral Study of the South African Fishing Industry 2000). In April 2004 the Marine Steward Council distinguished the South African hake fishery for responsible management.
14 South Africa represents a unique situation where management structure has taken a large overhaul the past decade (Branch and Clark 2006; van Sittert et al. 2006) . This reform has resulted in innovative management fueled mostly by socio-political reasons rather than biological or economic factors (van Sittert et al. 2006) . We also notice the considerable attention given to socio-economic factors in the South African fisheries as now with new equity goals, small-scale and subsistence fishermen have rights to secure fishing access (Branch and Clark 2006; van Sittert et al. 2006) . Stakeholder involvement in management is facilitated through management procedures that are user-friendly and make the management of a fish stock more transparent for stakeholders by incorporating them in the management process and by focusing on simpler, case-specific, population-based models and laying down the trade-offs between lowering risk and securing future catch (Butterworth and Punt 1999) . Time will tell if hake stocks continue to respond with sustained production. In the meantime, we give the label ''success'' to this management.
Alaskan sockeye salmon ''Orderly, organized pandemonium'' is how manager Paul Salomone describes the chaotic six-week season with over 90,000 landings. There is little doubt that the management of sockeye salmon in the Bristol Bay region has been a success and a profitable fishery. This may be explained by the combination of the management competency through assessment and enforcement, cooperation of smart, dedicated fishermen and the huge buffer of fish abundance in the area. Virtually pristine habitat for salmon in the area is also a factor for the large sockeye runs.
Clear constitutional conservation mandates, policy transparency, stakeholder involvement and cooperation and sound science together play important parts in our label of ''success'' for the sustainable salmon management. Admittedly, the shear abundance of the sockeye salmon in the Bristol Bay area along with reliable assessment techniques and good enforcement is a real luxury for managers. The result is that the managers can use the fleet to manage the stock as opposed to other areas in Alaska with lower salmon abundance (for example the Yukon region) that must supply the escapement first (P. Salomone pers. comm.).
Chinook salmon
Pacific salmon in the northwest United States has met drastic habitat losses since 1850 due to anthropogenic activities such as hydropower and logging resulting in population decline and extinction (Nehlsen et al. 1991) . Also high harvest rates (up to 60%) have historically contributed to the population declines. Habitat destruction is the single biggest issue facing the conservation of chinook salmon in the northwestern United States. The Pacific salmon's complexity of habitat and life history traits (Nehlsen et al. 1991) add to management challenges, which include urban growth and multiple user groups (Young et al. 2006) . Scheuerell et al. (2006) present a spatially explicit modeling framework for recovery plans of salmon that incorporates the effects of habitat change, life history, hatchery operations and harvest management actions.
In general, current performance of the chinook comanagement in Puget Sound is good with consistent production regimes and an overall stable abundance for the stocks (W. Beattie pers. comm.). However, this is a general statement and management performance and stock production varies from district to district. Local fisheries managers and NMFS state that the stock is managed according to the stringent Endangered Species Act standard under U.S. law. But many private organizations devoted to chinook conservation argue that the authorities have not reduced harvesting enough. In fact, lawsuits have been filed against NMFS accusing the harvest rates for not being conservative enough given chinook's threatened status under the Endangered Species Act (W. Beattie pers. comm.). The large debate of hatcheries is also very polarized and lawsuits are instigated by local non-governmental and non-profit organizations (W. Beattie pers. comm.).
The Puget Sound Salmon Commission started the Sound Catch TM program to ease the sale of flourishing stocks in the Puget Sound despite lack of local markets (Puget Sound Salmon Commission 2003) . We see this concept as a step to promote healthy harvest due to the economic incentive for fishermen to reach out to the eco-friendly consumer market.
Even though the salmon faces some serious productivity issues in certain regions and is a threatened species, we regard the management itself as effective. We view the decrease in stock production as mostly due to destruction of habitat and not to current failure of management, and give the label of ''potential problems'' for this stock.
Southern bluefin tuna
Southern bluefin tuna is severely overfished. One estimate predicts that even if zero catch was put in place today, the southern bluefin tuna would not be able to recover from overfishing due to only 3% of the spawning stock biomass is left. 15 The biological nature of Southern bluefin tuna, it being a large, slow growing, fast swimming and highly migratory fish, makes it a difficult subject for which to study reproduction biology and population dynamics. The assessment is full of large uncertainties for both the biological parameters and input data (cited Polacheck et al. 1999; Polacheck 2002) .
In 1998, a commissioned peer review panel pointed out the negative relationship between science and management within the Scientific Committee and the Stock Assessment Group (Maguire et al. 1998) . It has been difficult for the Commission to agree on management advice due to conflicting national interests of member countries and uncertainties in the stock assessment. Unfortunately, this is not uncommon for international tuna management organizations. It is often the case that when large commissions convene to decide catch levels for such a valuable resource as bluefin tuna, scientific advice clashes with the agenda of lobbyists for the tuna industry who are sometimes national delegates.
Commercial value, especially in the Japanese sashimi market, for Southern bluefin tuna has contributed to overexploitation of a delicate resource. The issue of large uncertainty of stock assessments, common for tuna species, plus the difficulties of multi-nation administration complicates the management issue even more (A. Bodsworth, pers. comm.). Stock assessment is very difficult for highly migratory tuna species and seems to affect the effectiveness of management. These problems, plus internal disputes within the CCSBT (Polacheck 2002) undermine the management process (Hunt 2006) .
We conclude with the label of ''serious problems'' for the management of this stock due to very low stock abundance and recruitment, overcapacity and overfishing, including illegal fishing.
Pacific halibut
Pacific halibut receives our label of ''success''. Among all the stocks in this paper, Pacific halibut has been managed most successfully for the longest time. The IPHC is able to use their resources to focus on any problems that arise in the fishery and has a history of encouraging public participation. Hilborn et al. (2005) note the incentives of high scientific and management standards from which the IPHC staff benefit. Here stakeholders are encouraged to comment and contribute input to management decisions in the IPHC in order for the management to stay in touch with the social and economic environment of the fishery (Marine Stewardship Council 2006b ).
The IPHC's annual report (IPHC 2004 ) included poetry, pictures and prose. Readability of annual reports should certainly lead to a larger public audience and higher transparency of the management of the fishery at hand. In the case of the IPHC, a former press secretary has aided the tedious annual report writing and spiced up the language and added anecdotes.
Greenland halibut (NAFO, 3LMNO)
Since the development of the Division 3LMNO fishery in 1990, management of Greenland halibut has not shown positive stock trends. To the credit of NAFO, the low spawning stock biomass has led to that a 15-year rebuilding plan has been implemented. Even so, the rebuilding plan did not get off to a good start: in 2004, the catch exceeded the plan by 27%. Overcapacity is the presumed main trouble of the fishery today.
The objective of NAFO in their 15-year rebuilding plan of having an exploitable biomass of Greenland halibut, aged 5 years and older, ''of 140,000 tons on average allowing a stable yield over the long-term'' (NAFO 2005c) is problematic. We raise the question: can this unspecific goal setting be seriously considered as a realistic conservation measure in a rebuilding plan? The terminology ''on average'' and ''long-term'' is very imprecise for a serious rebuilding plan of an international organization. Shelton (2005a) gives further insight into the problems of the rebuilding plan.
For other stocks, (i.e., Barents Sea cod mentioned earlier in this review) very specific and clear reference points (i.e., B lim , B pa ) are set for the stock in accordance with a precautionary approach. These reference points give a benchmark for monitoring the stock according to objectives after each stock assessment. According to our interpretation of NAFO's objective here, the goal of an exploitable biomass of 140,000 may only be qualified after the 15-year plan is completed and the average exploitable biomass can be calculated. Admittedly, biological reference points for this specific stock have been difficult to assess. Shelton (2005b) provides simulation work with stochastic projections for a potential new rebuilding plan according to the precautionary approach. This type of work is visibly needed as a scientific basis for a rebuilding plan.
We evaluate this stock's management as having ''serious problems'' due to the currently reduced productivity of the stock, overcapacity of the fishing fleet, lack of clear, peer-reviewed rebuilding plans and the current situation of overshooting the recommended catch. We hope to see progress in these areas if managers and stakeholders are serious about saving one of the last groundfish fisheries in the NAFO area from commercial extinction.
Patagonian toothfish
We note the remarkable way CCAMLR is able to use a consensus approach to setting annual TAC levels, especially faced with the fact of the very large value of the Patagonian toothfish resource they manage in a commission of twenty-four member countries. Patagonian toothfish is currently synonymous with IUU fishing. CCAMLR and other organizations have made strides in combating the international contra-banding (e.g., talks with Flag of Convenience countries Belize and Panama). Also, FAO has developed International Plans of Action against IUU fishing within the framework of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and subsequent workshops handling with national plans of action have been held. We consider the management of Patagonian toothfish good, but struggling under the special circumstances of huge geographical area, little data and the amount of illegal fishing. Therefore, we use the label ''serious problems'' to describe this fishery's management.
Discussion
Although it is virtually impossible to formulate all important management considerations into a onesize-fits-all management procedure (Caddy and Seijo 2005) , this is no excuse for not learning from the past. Admittedly, some managers have an easier time than others given the state of the stock (Hilborn 2006), political climate and stakeholder solidarity. This paper reviewed experiences in thirteen different commercial fisheries as a basis for a worldwide perspective into the state of the art of today's fisheries management. We now endeavor to make general conclusions on what works and what does not in fisheries management.
We highlight four points that we consider important in fisheries management: robust management, biological limits (reference points), implementation and consensus. First, by robust management we mean management that is able to make tough decisions (such as reducing TACs or denying expansion of a fishing fleet) but also management that is ''loose'' enough for stocks that have little assessment or biological data that are victims of high uncertainty by default (i.e., Greenland halibut, Patagonian toothfish, Southern bluefin tuna). Second, for stocks that are pushed to their biological production and exploitation limits (i.e., cod in the Barents Sea and Iceland), accurate assessment is needed for management to tiptoe on the fine line of sustainability and population collapse. Caddy and Mahon (1995) present an overview on reference points and note that it must be possible to convert a ''conceptual reference point'' (e.g., maximum yield) to a quantifiable ''technical reference point'' (e.g., maximum sustainable yield) in order to implement fishery management.
Third, paper management decisions do not imply management implementation. Caddy and Agnew (2003) mention that management infrastructure and the socio-economic context of management outweighs the analytical stock assessments in the context of recovery schemes. Furthermore, Hilborn et al. (2005) point out the importance for institutional systems to signal incentives to fishermen as a way to ensure compatibility with management and conservation strategies. This leads to management consensus between stakeholders that strengthen the backbone of quota compliance. We also note that when quota levels drop, market prices for fish go up, and this economic principle may make it easier to achieve stakeholder agreement. Finally, the crucial step towards management success is the creation of clearly defined objectives with participation from stakeholders. As easy as it sounds, experience (especially in Europe) shows that this step is often cut out in the creation of a management plan. It becomes more and more clear that attempts toward stakeholder consensus in the beginning phases of a management plan (i.e., setting objectives for the fishery) are very important to the future progress of management (ICES 2007a) . Without clear objectives built through stakeholder meetings with managers, scientists cannot efficiently evaluate all the different possible management strategies within their timeframe. Stakeholders and managers may request the aid of scientists to show them different alternatives for objectives at this beginning phase to help the process of building a management plan (ICES 2007a) .
Often in fisheries, one may predict management success or failure from the available knowledge of the stock-recruitment information for a fish stock. The stocks reviewed in this article all had some sort of estimated stock-recruitment relationship. The stocks with the most uncertain stock-recruitment relationships (lesser sandeel, Southern bluefin tuna, Patagonian toothfish) were not among the successes, but mostly due to other factors including overcapacity and illegal fishing or environmental change. Caddy and Seijo (2005) point to the fact that the region with the world's highest density of fisheries scientists, the North Atlantic, is also home to many unsustainable fish stocks, showing that fisheries management is not just science alone.
Balancing and weighing trade-offs of conservation, employment, maximum economic yield or biological reference points characterize fisheries management (Hilborn 2007). Hilborn (2006) reviews the Bristol Bay salmon fishery and discerns that the current biological objective is in direct conflict with potential economic and social sustainability. Gates (2005) reviews the history of the Pacific halibut fishery and lists the economic and social benefits after the individual fishing quotas (IFQs) and individual vessel quotas (IVQs) were passed in the Unites States and Canada, respectively. No direct benefit to stock status or landing was observed (Gates 2005) , which represents a negligible biological trade-off to the undeniable socio-economic success rights-based fishing has brought to the Pacific halibut.
The successes
The fishery management ''successes'' reviewed were Alaskan sockeye salmon, Pacific halibut and South African cape hakes. Some aspects of management that these three have in common include relative geographical isolation with very good fleet capacity control. When the international fleet fishing the cape hakes in South Africa was excluded after the creation of the EEZ, hake populations recovered partly due to increased fleet control. In addition, South Africa has made large headway in equity in rights-ownership of their fisheries and is in the midst of long-term quota allocations, thus underlining the socio-economic significance in their fisheries management policy (Branch and Clark 2006) .
Stakeholder involvement, by which we define as engagement and participation by people with direct relevancy to the fishing industry, in the management process is another clear familiarity for these three successes. Sutinen (1999) acknowledges potentials for co-management as a vehicle for the key role of user participation within fishery management plans. Paramor et al. (2005) describe a technique and experience in involving stakeholders and their input in the development of an ecosystem-based management plan. Baelde (2005) cites experiences of stakeholder collaboration in the development of marine protected areas and notes that effective management of natural resources includes participation from those directly affected by management measures. Lack of stakeholder consultation with the fishing industry has in the past resulted in counterproductive anguish for Australian fisheries management (Baelde 2005) . The research for this paper revealed small tidbits encouraging stakeholder participation. For example, the Alaskan Board of Fisheries posted driving directions to stakeholder consultation meetings on their website. We do not consider any type of communication to stakeholders as trivial and encourage interactive use of updated websites as one of many important communication tools with stakeholders.
Similarities between the three stocks with management success are that they are healthy and productive, medium to long-lived species that respond well to fleet control. History backs this conclusion up for two of the stocks. Both Pacific halibut and cape hakes were overexploited at one point, but successfully recovered after fleet control was established. Alaskan sockeye salmon managers have the luxury of managing a large, productive stock with a cooperative, limitedly international fishing fleet.
The failures
As far as what doesn't work in fisheries management, common themes for Southern bluefin tuna and Patagonian toothfish are overcapacity of fleets fishing long-lived/low fecundity straddling stocks . Both of these stocks suffer also from high market demand due to their prized meat. High market demand and low fecundity is a double-whammy for stocks that need to recover. Sound management and recovery for these types of stocks should attempt to include cooperation with the market in order to control the demand for the resource. The CCSBT developed and implemented a Trade Information Scheme (TIS), or a fish tracking receipt, in which member countries ensure that all imports of southern bluefin tuna include an official, completed TIS document. The TIS document includes the detailed information about the catch and from which fishing vessel it came (CCSBT 2005b) . This scheme would hold member countries accountable for importing illegal catches of bluefin.
The international commissions of NAFO, CCSBT, and CCAMLR face three major challenges: management of long-lived, low-fecund stocks; international fleets and interests; and enforcement in the high seas. These challenges are unique to international commissions and not present in our ''success'' stocks, which are more classified as single nation, single water cases of fishery management. International commissions are notorious for their very long process times, which impede reactive management (such as high seas enforcement against IUU fishing and dialogue with countries issuing flags of convenience) and can be misused by lobbyists to slow down talks of fishing quota cuts.
There was only one reviewed fishery, the Chinese anchovy fishery, which received the worst ranking of ''failure'' on our scale. It is very difficult to assess this fishery further as documents and statistics are extremely hard to obtain (Chen 1999), even by professionals visiting the country (S. Iversen pers. comm.).
Conclusions
The aptitude of the fisheries managers to set modest fishing mortality rates as well as government support to react in time to overcapacity and regime shift of recruitment seem to be paramount for the success fisheries management. Stock-specific issues in fisheries management tend to be unique combinations of the natural system and the human system. How fisheries are managed affects the ecosystems of the earth as well as national and private economies. Stakeholder collaboration from creating objectives to fishery assessment and evaluation along with peerreviewed, government-supported policies built on scientific experience and innovation are general ingredients for sound fisheries management.
